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Abstract: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this investigation is to examine the phenomena of strategic alliances among 
maritime carriers. During the last decade this process has accelerated, jointly with the 
introduction of megaships in the industry. This has caused the number of operators in 
the market to fall to only four big alliances controlling the 99% of the market share. 
The main argument provided by companies is that this process is done to gain 
economies of scale and operational synergies.  In order to test this argument an 
average cost function that depends on the number of operators in the industry, thus if 
there are strategic agreements or not among carriers, has been estimated and it has 
been found to decrease when strategic alliances are established. This means a better 
situation in terms of efficiency due to the concentration of the sector but it does not 
mean lower prices or an increase in the general level of welfare. Testing this goes far 
from the scope of this research but it could be interesting to pursue the investigation 
in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resum: 
 
 
L’objectiu d’aquest treball de fi de grau és investigar el fenomen de les aliances 
estratègiques  entre  les  empreses navilieres que operen en  el sector del transport 
marítim. Durant la darrera dècada aquest procés s’ha vist accelerat i ha anat de la mà 
de la creació i posta en operació de portacontenidors cada cop més grans fins al punt 
d’arribar-se a encarregar vaixells de fins a 21.000 TEUs, la unitat estàndard de mesura 
en el sector de la logística marítima. 
 
El procés de formació d’aliances ha estat justificat argumentat que aquestes suposen 
guanys a nivell d’eficiència, sinèrgies operacionals i economies d’escala, a més del fet 
de permetre posar en operativa vaixells més grans amb la reducció en el cost total mig 
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 Vessel 
 Economies of scale 
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per TEU que això suposa. Que existeixen economies d’escala a nivell de vaixell, és a dir 
que  el  cost  per  TEU  si  s’utilitza  un  vaixell  més  gran  és  menor  que  en  el  cas  de 
utilitzar-ne un de petit, és  quelcom generalment acceptat en la literatura i en el sector, 
el que no està acceptat és que el mateix passi en el cas de les navilieres, que si en 
comptes de dues empreses operant de forma separada només ni ha una, és a dir que la 
mida mitjana de l’operador incrementi, el cost per TEU decreixi. 
 
Aquest treball té l’objectiu de testar aquest argument, de provar si existeixen o no 
economies  d’escala  a  nivell  de  naviliera  i  si  una  aliança  estratègica  significa  una 
reducció de costos o no. Per fer-ho s’ha estimat una funció de cost total mig, cost per 
TEU, a nivell de vaixell. Per establir la relació entre el vaixells i les navilieres o aliances 
que els operen s’ha introduït en aquesta funció una variable que representa la 
utilització dels vaixells i s’ha estimat un model economètric per esbrinar si aquesta 
variable varia al formar-se aliances o no. 
 
S’ha trobat que la concentració en la indústria i la formació d’aliances afecta 
positivament el grau d’utilització mig dels portacontenidors i que la funció de costos 
depenent del nombre d’operadors en la indústria té pendent negativa, per tant que es 
formessin aliances estratègiques entre les diferents navilieres suposaria increments en 
el nivell d’eficiència de la indústria i reduccions de costos. 
 
Això no  vol  dir  que  hi  hagin  millores  a  nivell  d’excedent  del  consumidor,  que  el 
benestar total incrementi o que els preus del noli baixin, tot això està lluny del que 
avarca aquest treball però degut a la importància que té el transport marítim per a la 
bona salut  d’una  economia global seria interessant continuar la investigació en el 
futur.
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Introduction: 
 
 
 
 
 
Recent years, especially after the global crisis that hit the world and had tremendous 
effects on global maritime transport, have been truly interesting for agents implicated 
in this economic sector. Things have changed really fast and the new scenario is highly 
complex and has numerous implications for all of the stakeholders. Operators have 
acted and, in the process of reducing costs, vessel size has almost doubled. 
 
That process has been completed in the last years by an important concentration in 
the container shipping carriers. The market structure has changed and were we had in 
2009 more than 10 operators now we have only 4 big alliances, formed by the previous 
 
operators, controlling the market. What is more important two of the biggest shipping 
lines, Maersk and MSC, have formed the 2M alliance which controls the 35% of 
containership trade in the Europe-Far  East  route.  At the same time  that  the  2M 
shipping alliance was formed the Oceans 3 alliance, formed by the agreement among 
CMA CGM, CSCL and UASC began to operate. This process, in addition with the 
agreement between two on the historic alliances, Grand alliance and New World 
alliance to form the G6 alliance in November 2011 and the inclusion of Evergreen, one 
of the predominant carriers, in the CKYHE agreement on April 2014 has ended to a 
really concentrated market with 4 big alliances, 2M, OCEANS 3, CKYHE and G6 
controlling de 99% of the Europe-Far East containerized trade. The only carrier that 
remains outside the process of concentration is Zim, with a 1% market share in the 
Europe-Fare East route and a 3% in the transatlantic route.
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The change in the supply structure of the maritime transport market between 2009 
 
and 2015 can be summarized by the following graphs: 
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An alliance is a long term agreement between two or more carriers where a shipping 
liner commits to collaborate with the other operators when operating ships, 
rationalizing  capacity  through  joint-scheduling,  slot-chartering,  terminal  and 
equipment sharing, and designing operational networks, to name just a few of their 
functions. Not all the routes and services are operated by the alliances, there are some 
services that are operated by only one carrier or by the others acting separately but 
these pattern of actuation has to be accorded by the members of the agreement. 
Theoretically members of an alliance are not involved in price-setting when they 
operate out of the alliance but it is true that there seem to appear strong incentives to 
collude when designing the agreement. 
 
Members of alliances justify their collaboration because of cost reducing but there is 
no empiric evidence about that. This cost reduction could happen mainly because of 
two reasons: The first one is that alliances would allow shippers to operate larger 
vessels, due to the economies of scale that vessels present up to certain point 
collaboration between carriers would mean a more efficient allocation of resources. 
The second reason emphasizes operational synergies between different shipping lines 
when operating together. This would mean fewer vessels to carry the same number of 
TEUs or even a superior level of total output due lower freight rates, higher levels of 
vessel capacity utilization and lower logistics inland costs, to sum up operational 
synergies would mean fuller vessels at lower prices. This would obviously have a 
positive effect on efficiency and average total costs. 
 
Alliances have been justified by members by efficiency reasons, but is it the true 
reason?  Acting  together  could  mean  lower  output  levels  so  higher  prices  and 
monopoly power. Theoretically alliances are not involved in price setting but this is not 
a guarantee that they do not do it. Which is the real motivation of alliances? Does the 
average total cost reduction really exist?
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Objectives: 
 
 
 
 
 
To try to answer the previous questions, to investigate if economies of scale really exist 
in the maritime transport sector at the company level is the principal aim of this 
research. There is little literature on this field; previous research focuses on scale 
economies at the ship level and implications for ports and regulators. Carriers have 
been analyzed mainly from a competition policy and regulation point of view, but I 
have not found a paper trying to assess the behavior of the average cost function of a 
carrier.  I will focus on trying to assess the cost per TEU and to link it with the size of 
the alliance. 
 
Maritime transport is the main transport mode in the modern economy, it allows labor 
division and specialization, it has caused an increasing level of welfare for the world 
population and it is one of the main factors behind globalization and reduction of 
poverty, this is why it is so important that it behaves correctly and that carriers, the 
main operators in that sector act efficiently so, understanding why carriers are forming 
alliances seems to be really important in order to guarantee that the positive effects of 
maritime transport will continue or even increase. 
 
Strictly talking  an  alliance  is  not  a company, when  two or  more  carriers  form  an 
alliance they remain independent and do not merge but, from an economic point of 
view it can be understood that, collaborating through a long term agreement, they act 
as one so through an alliance independent liners would achieve the same gains in 
efficiency as if they merge. 
 
I will propose some reasons that would justify the scale economies, I will propose a 
methodology to adapt the cost per TEU function from the ship level to the operator 
level and I am going to estimate this function. After my research I hope I will be able to 
answer the following question: Are shipping carriers achieving economies of scale 
through their alliances? 
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An overview on previous literature 
 
 
 
 
 
Maritime transport is clearly one of the most important fields in a globalized economy, 
most of long-distance traded goods are transported by ship so the efficiency of the 
maritime transport industry is obviously a necessary condition for the world economy 
to achieve a sustainable path of growth, to increase welfare, allocate resources 
correctly and to provide cheap goods to the population. 
 
According to the importance that this field has to our society a huge amount of 
literature  has  been  created  covering  a  broad  range  of  topics  such  as  regulatory 
aspects, effects of trade liberalization on welfare and growth,  technical and economic 
characteristics of vessels, the industry structure and organization or the behaviour of 
the principal agents, to name just a few. 
 
Shipping liners are, jointly with ports, the principal actors of maritime transport sector 
and literature about these companies is also huge and covering different aspects. The 
regulatory framework and its effects have been largely examined and the same can be 
said about the theoretical impossibility of a perfectly competitive market within this 
industry, mainly following the “empty core” theory that proposes that due to the 
extremely high fixed costs and the relatively low marginal costs a competitive market 
would not allow agents to recover their investment so the maritime transportation 
services would not be provided. This is the main reason and theoretical argument to 
give an exemption of main competition laws to the operators and even to allow liners 
to form cartels, the so called “shipping conferences” that ruled the market before the 
21th century began. 
 
 
Strategic alliances are relatively new phenomena, the first wave was at the end of 
 
1996 with the New World Alliance and the Grand Alliance agreement and the 
acceptance process of this horizontal integration method has been slow and focused 
on particular geographical regions. It is not until our days that alliances have 
consolidated and are viewed by operators as the right way to proceed, if not the only
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way of  continuing  in  the  industry.  This is why  literature is  not  as focused  in this 
phenomenon as it is in other fields but, fortunately, some authors have been studying 
alliances among liner shipping operators from different points of view. There is an 
inherent degree of instability in a joint venture as strategic alliances are, Midoro and 
Pitto (2000) studied it and founded that   organizational complexity, the way of 
designing incentives and competition among  alliances members where the main rulers 
of this instability, which postponed the consolidation of the alliance way of operating. 
This complexity appears to be lower nowadays, when the alliances process is 
consolidating and there is much more knowhow of the right way of doing these 
agreements. Network designing, route frequency, the allocation of vessels and other 
operational issues have been investigated by Ryan (2001) and Slack et al. (2002) and 
they found some significant changes caused by strategic alliances such as the 
intensification of services and the deployment of larger vessels. Cariou (2002) built an 
operational model which had the function to assign different vessels among different 
routes depending on the number of carriers operating in the industry. He found that 
fewer  operators  would  be  more  efficient  in  assigning  correctly  the  vessels  in  the 
specific routes to cover a determinate demand. 
 
Kadar (1996) submitted an hypothesis really similar to the one examined in this 
investigation, that in the case of liner shipping companies alliances one plus one is 
more than two so an strategic alliance would mean an increase of the joint output 
greater than the sum of previous individual outputs. This is clearly an explanation of 
economies of scale in the liner shipping industry. Unfortunately the period where this 
analysis was done, at the beginning of the first generation of alliances, could not allow 
Kadar to test his hypothesis and do empirical research. 
 
Economies of scale  have been intensively tested at the vessel level, the so called 
economies of size. The main hypothesis is that an increase in the total capacity of the 
ship, the amount of TEUs it can carry, would mean a decrease of the average total cost, 
the average cost per TEU. On the other hand an opposite effect is produced by an 
increase of the ship capacity, when this size increases some negative effects are 
produced such as an increase in the problems of going into the port, the increase of
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auxiliary ships to operate and  an increase in the problems for loading the total slots of 
the ship, among others.  That could mean a transfer of costs from maritime operators 
to the inland agents, to ports, terminals, inland logistics companies and finally to the 
shippers, companies that import and export goods using maritime transport services. 
 
As it usually happens in economic fields, the two effects are always present and the 
predominant view is that as the vessel size increases the first effect, the scale 
economies, tends to disappear so the second derivative of the cost function would be 
lower than zero. The second effect, the problems of cascade, problems of completing 
the ship utilization and cost transfers to inland operators would increase more than 
proportionally with the increase of the ship size. This phenomena has been studied by 
Kendall (1972), Graham(1994), Lim (1994), Cullinane and Khanna (2000), Stopford 
(2004) Gkonis and Psaraftis (2009), and  OECD/ITF (2015), to say some names among a 
long list. Their general conclusion is similar, that there are scale economies for 
containerships but tend to disappear as vessel size increase. 
 
Thus, the general conclusion is that there is an optimal size of the ship that is the point 
as from negative effects are greater than the economies of scale cost reductions. This 
point   has   never   been   reached   and   empirical   literature,   industry   agents   and 
stakeholders are always increasing the size of the theoretical optimal ship, as well as 
dynamic factors such as technology or port gains in efficiency are confirming that 
pattern. By the year 2000 the commonly accept optimal size was about 9000 TEUs, 
nowadays the industry accepts ships of about 20.100 TEUs as the optimal ones, and we 
are almost at a step to surpass this barrier, liners are constantly ordering new vessels 
to cover transport demand and this vessels are every day bigger and more efficient. If 
this ship is the optimal one will depend on many factors such as the industry and ports 
flexibility and capacity of adaptation, technology and the behaviour of the demand. 
 
Theoretical and empirical literature about maritime literature is huge and covers a 
broad range of topics, however the hypothesis that strategic alliances can cause scale 
economies has been little studied and not at all with modern data, is this why it can be 
really interesting to investigate this phenomenon.
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Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
The relevant market in this research is the Europe-Far East route, this route has been 
chosen in order to introduce simplicity in the research and assuming that the behavior 
of the average cost does not depend on the route. Furthermore it is the route where 
the four alliances control a more significant share of the total capacity. 
 
The service analyzed is transporting a TEU from Europe to a Far East port, including 
port costs and container loading and unloading, so the final function will be the cost 
per TEU in a Europe-Far East service.  A TEU, acronym of twenty-feet-equivalent unit is 
the standard measure unit used in the transport and logistics sector and more 
specifically in the maritime transport sector. It is an inexact unit of measure equivalent 
to a standardized twenty feet container; the exterior measures of these containers are 
6,1m x 2,4m x 2,6m. 
 
 
Following Lim (1994) and Stopford (2004) cost structure of container shipping can be 
separated in fixed costs (Operating costs and capital costs), that are defined 
independently of the number of services that a ship does in an year or the number of 
TEUs that it carries, and variable costs (Port charges, container costs and bunker costs), 
that depend on the number of services or the amount of TEUs carried in a service. 
 
Taking all this into account I have defined an average total cost function that depends 
on ship size and total TEUs carried per voyage: 
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Where; 
 
 
Q: Number of TEUs carried 
 
 
Ss: Ship size, total capacity expressed in TEUs that the vessel is supposed to be able to 
carry when it is fully carried. 
 
Op: Operating costs per day. This is defined as crew expenses, stores and lubricants, 
maintenance and insurance cost per day, as well as the expenses of administration of 
the vessel. 
 
Tt: Total time of the operation (Turnaround), it includes time in port and time at sea 
and time in port includes time in the European port and time in the Chinese port. The 
total turnaround time used is of 31 days; it is divided as 27 days at sea and 4 in port, 
two at each one. That data is from the regular liner observatory of the Port Authority 
of Barcelona. 
 
K: Capital costs per day taking into account an expected life of 20 years, 4% of annual 
interest rate and no residual value (OECD, 2015). 
 
Pq: Port cost per container set by the local port authority, this cost is present in both 
the departure and the arrival port. This cost is the median of costs provided by the 
port bill of the Port Authority of Barcelona. 
 
Ps: Port cost per ship set by the local port authority, this cost varies with the ship size 
and will be taken into account two times because it is present in the two ports. This 
cost is the median of costs provided by the port bill of the Port Authority of Barcelona. 
In this bill the cost per ship is expressed as a function of GT, a unit of measure of the 
total size of a ship, in order to transform this unit to the standard one, TEUs, a formula 
provided by the “ECOcalculadora” of the Port Authority of Barcelona has been used. 
 
Hc: Handling cost per container set by the terminal operator, it is taken into account 
two times, loading and downloading.
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Z: Insurance cost per container 
 
 
M: Maintenance cost per container 
 
 
Sc: Size of container, it is the number of TEUs that are equivalent to a container. The 
sample container is of 40 standardized feet so its size equivalency expressed in TEUs is 
of two TEUs 
 
B:  Bunker cost (Fuel cost)  per  voyage.  This cost has been calculated assuming a 
constant speed of 22 knots and a price of 300$ per ton of fuel (OECD, 2015). The 
distance used is of 8.776,6 nautical miles (Regular liner observatory of the Port 
Authority of Barcelona). 
 
All these costs have been adapted and converted in order to represent the total cost 
per day. The turnaround time of a service beginning at the Port of Barcelona (Europe) 
and ending in Shanghai (China) is of 31 days thus, multiplying the number of days by 
the cost per day the result is the effective cost per TEU and per day 
 
The previous equation can be rewritten as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where; 
 
 
U: Degree of utilization of the total ship’s capacity. This U term has been introduced in 
order to link the cost function with the operational synergies that are supposed to 
happen due to the strategic alliances between carriers. The degree of utilization is 
calculated dividing the effective amount of TEUs carried by a vessel with the total 
capacity of that vessel.
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With the estimation of this cost function and its representation the hypothesis of the 
scale economies of containerships will be tested, if the cost per TEU, the equivalent of 
the average total cost, decreases when the size of the vessel increases, this is the 
equivalent of the total output for a ship assuming 100% of utilization, then it will be 
proved than larger vessels cause economies of scale and gains in efficiency. 
 
Up to this point all the estimations of different costs have been analyzed at a ship level 
and strategic alliances have not been introduced in the analysis. The next step is to 
introduce a link between costs of chartering a containership to Shanghai and strategic 
alliances, in order to do it a utilization rate term has been introduced previously. This 
term might be correlated with the number of operators acting in the market, when 
strategic alliances are created the level of utilization of the ships in the industry might 
increase due to the operational synergies among the different operators. 
 
In order to test this relationship an OLS model will be estimated: 
 
 
 
 
 
Where; 
 
 
α: Constant term 
 
 
U: Is the average rate of utilization of vessels in the market, data comes from the 
estimation of alpaliner consultancy provided in their monthly market monitor 
publication. This is the dependent variable of the estimation and it is assumed to show 
operational results in the industry, a low rate of utilization of vessels means that the 
effective capacity does not match with the real demand, that ships are underused and 
that there is inefficiency in the operational network. If ships are not fully loaded that is 
supposed to cause negative effects that will result on higher costs for shippers, liners 
and stakeholders.
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N: Number of operator in the industry. Carriers or alliances that represent more than a 
 
1% of the total market share are considered operators. When an alliance is formed the 
total number of operators decreases by the number of carriers forming the alliance 
minus one. This variable is the key term in order to test the scale economies caused by 
strategic alliances. If the coefficient of this variable appears to be significant it will 
mean that there is an effective correlation between the two terms. Some lags of this 
variable will also be introduced in the analysis following the reasoning that effects of a 
strategic agreement may take some time to appear. 
 
Ss: Average size of the ship. This variable has been estimated using data of alphaliner 
consultancy  and  dividing the total operative capacity of  the whole market  by the 
number of operative ships. It is an average of all ships operating in the market and it is 
assumed to show the effect of the introduction of megaships in the maritime transport 
industry. As it is an average the effect of the introduction of a new megaship will be 
partially compensated by the fact that older and smaller ships are not substituted but 
still maintained operative.  It is possible that this variable underestimates the complete 
effect in the rate of utilization of the introduction of new megaships but it is still a 
good proxy because it is pondering that effect by the effective importance that 
megaships have  in  the industry. It is true that the tendency to order big ships is 
accelerating but the importance that this megaships have in the total supply is still 
small. 
 
D: Demand. This variable shows the evolution of the demand for maritime transport 
services in the economy. This variable is a good proxy of economic activity as well as of 
the substitutive industries to maritime transport. It is assumed to be closely correlated 
with the dependent variable and to explain the most of its variability. Data has also 
been collected at the alpaliners monthly monitor newsletter. This is an estimation 
carried out by alphaliner and the specific methodology of this estimation is unknown. 
 
ε: Error term
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The result will be an estimation using 75 monthly observations and covering the period 
from January 2009 to March 2015, so a temporal series of 3 independent variables. 
 
Once this model has been estimated it is possible to introduce the proxy of the size of 
carriers, the number of operators, as a determinant of the average cost function. To 
show and test the effect of establishing an alliance in the average total cost function 
the variable utilization in the second cost function is substituted by   the model that 
explains utilization as a dependent variable of the number of operators, demand and 
average ship size, then the demand and average vessel size variables are maintained 
constant, the first one 880.000 TEUs and the second at 3.735 TEUs, this values 
correspond  to  the  real  values  of  February  2014,  month  that  has  been  chosen 
arbitrarily. 
 
The  last  step  is  analyzing  the  resultant  function,  that  only  has  one  independent 
variable as a random variable so changing the values of it will show whether strategic 
agreements, thus the increase of the size of an operator, are causing  scale economies 
or not. 
 
To sum up, the main data sources are: 
 
 
Port Authority of Barcelona: Port costs, both for container and for vessels and handling 
costs, turnaround time and distances, GT to TEUs formula. 
 
OECD, International transport forum: The impact of Mega-ships (paper):  Capital costs, 
operating costs and bunker costs. 
 
Stopford   (2004):   In   this   book   data   from   Drewry   consultancy   about   costs   of 
maintenance and insurance of a container are showed. This data has been used to 
estimate the correspondent costs. 
 
Alphaliner consultancy: Monthly monitor: Average ship size, demand of maritime 
transport services and average utilization of vessels in the market.
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Results: 
 
 
 
 
 
The first step in order to analyze the existence of scale economies and gains in 
efficiency due to the formation of strategic alliances among carriers has been analyzing 
the presence of scale economies at the vessel level. Almost all the costs that result 
from transporting a good from Europe to the Far-East, the service analyzed in this 
paper, can be imputed to costs of fleeting a vessel with its crew and its containers. 
 
This is the main reason why it is fundamental to have a first overview on the cost 
function from the ship point of view. A carrier, or a strategic alliance, is not more than 
a company that has different vessels among different routes so the cost function of 
fleeting a vessel from an initial port to another port will be truly related with the cost 
function of the shipping liners. 
 
The cost function of a ship doing the Europe-Far East route is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
This cost function contains the main components of the costs paid by operators. The 
main parts of the function are; operating costs such as crew wages, lubricants, stores 
and spares or dry docking. The next component is capital costs that are determined by 
the new building price as well as the cost of financing it. Costs in port are also a 
fundamental part of the function and here is where the first diseconomies of scale are 
supposed to appear, looking at ports legislation, prices for big vessels are greater so it 
can produce a negative effect in terms of costs. Finally costs per container, unrelated 
with the vessels size, and bunkering costs, are the last determinants of the cost of 
transporting on TEU from Europe to the Far-East region.
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The main data source that has been used to estimate the different costs has been the 
OECD paper: “The impact of megaships” (2015), as well as data coming directly from 
the Port Authority of Barcelona used to estimate direct port costs. From these data 
sources some calculus, estimations and changes have been introduced in order to have 
a better overview on costs structures. These costs can be summarized as follow; all 
costs are costs per TEU, the equivalent of talking of average total costs. The monetary 
unit of measures is US$: 
 
 
 
 
TEUs 5.652 7.500 9.000 12.500 15.000 19.000 
Bunkering 186 173 162 123 116 92 
Operating 47 39 34 28 27 23 
Capital 81 80 77 73 68 63 
Port  costs  per 
ship (2) 
0.34 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.30 
Port  costs  per 
 
container (2) 
33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Handling cost 138.75 138.75 138.75 138.75 138.75 138.75 
Container 
maintenance 
and insurance 
18,75 18,75 18,75 18,75 18,75 18,75 
TOTAL ($) 505 482 465 415 402 369 
 
Source: Own elaboration from OECD (2015), Stopford(2004) and Port Authority of Barcelona
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There is an evident  decrease in the fixed  costs of  a vessel when the size of it is 
increased. In variable costs, the costs related with cargo and containers, there is not 
reduction and it is possible than this costs increase due to problems at port such as 
handling too many containers, the entrance of the ship and other operational 
difficulties. Port authority dues per TEU seem to decrease up to a point where get 
stagnated. This cost is discretional and depend on public authorities so it cannot be 
interpreted as a result of market forces or economic factors. 
 
Bunkering costs also decrease with size. This can be interpreted as driven by two main 
forces; the first one is the decrease in average total cost as total capacity increases 
while the fuel consumption remains relatively stable because fuel consumption do not 
increase proportionally with total capacity of vessels. The second force is caused by 
gains in vessels efficiency and a better technological level of ships. As the biggest ships 
are also the newest there is an effect that is not related with economies of size but 
that seems to cause these economies. It would be interesting to try to correct this 
effect when analyzing economies of scale caused by megaships. 
 
Capital and operating costs, jointly with bunkering, are the main factors behind the 
reduction in the cost per TEU analyzed here. Capital and operating costs reduction can 
be mainly understood as fixed costs of a vessel when it is built and operated. The 
marginal cost increasing of building a bigger ship is not as big as the marginal cost 
reduction of increasing its capacity, this is due to mechanical and ship engineering 
factors and because of the way the ships are built. Analyzing operating costs we can 
see that operating a bigger ship does not need a proportional increase in the crew, the 
same happens with stores or lubricants. An ambiguous effect could take place with 
insurance costs. A bigger vessel surely means a higher risk premium but if it is 
compensate by the increasing capacity effect is not sure. However, what is clear is that 
as well as average capital cost, average operating costs decreases as total capacity 
increases.
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The following graph shows this effect: 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration from OECD (2015), Stopford(2004) and Port Authority of Barcelona 
 
 
Cost per TEU reduction is clear in the previous graph, as commonly is said by 
investigators on maritime transport, when ship size increases, cost per TEU decreases. 
What it is not so obvious is the reduction in the slope of the function when capacity 
increases.  Literature  has  emphasized  that  the  most  important  effect  of   scale 
economies took place when sips passed from 3.000 TEUs to 5.000, this segment has 
not been analysed so it can be the reason behind this apparent contradiction. What 
seems clear from this analysis point of view is that it is not always true that the scale 
economies  effect  tends to disappear  when the  ship increases too  much,  the  cost 
function  is  not  a  continuous  function  that  has  a  regular  and  stable  behaviour,  it 
depends on multiple and dynamic effects so it is possible that the point where the 
marginal cost reduction tends to zero has been postponed by technological changes or 
gains in port terminals efficiency. 
 
Slot issues and capacity analysis has not been introduced yet so it is also a possible 
reason to expect the slope of the function not to decrease. The main reason argued by 
previous literature  is that  economies of  scale  tend to disappear due to operating
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difficulties as well as capital and port costs increases. Capital costs have been found to 
decrease and port costs seem to be constant or to depend on exogenous factors. The 
next step in this analysis is to introduce slot and operating variables. 
 
In order to introduce utilization variables and to link vessel costs with carrier’s costs a 
new function has been defined transforming the initial one. The main step here is to 
redefine the variable “Quantity” as the multiplication of “Ship size” and “% of 
Utilization”. When a ship is carried with merchandise in a port it is not commonly 
carried with all its capacity. 
 
The percentage of utilization varies with different factors and one of these factors is 
probably  the  ship  size,  as  discussed  before.  The  more  interesting  variable  in  this 
analysis is however if shipping liners are acting jointly as a strategic alliance or are 
acting independently. One of the reasons that carriers have argued to form alliances is 
that acting together they would be able to offer more services to stakeholders, to 
increase the frequency, the quality of the vessel and to reduce the slot price increasing 
the percentage of utilization of the vessels. It can be understood that if it is needed in 
the industry to operate large ships and as the average ship size increases it is every 
time more difficult to full this ships. Strategic alliances could be an efficient way to 
maintain or even increase the utilization of ships, reducing costs. 
 
The redefined cost function, now introducing a link with strategic alliances and 
beginning to abandon the ship point of view is the following: 
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This  new  function,  that  redefines  the  variable  “Quantity”  and  introduces  a  link 
between operating issues and average total costs, so introduces by first time carriers in 
the  cost  function,  is  only  the  first  step  in  order  to  analyze  the  possible  gains  in 
efficiency derived from de settlement of strategic alliances. 
 
The  following  step  is  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  forming  an  alliance  means  an 
operating advantage so the average utilization of ships increases as agreements among 
carriers take place. To test this hypothesis an OLS model has been estimated 
introducing the variable “average % of utilization in the market” and to model it with 
different variables that are understood to explain its variability.   These variables are 
the  average  ship  size  in  the  market  which  is  supposed  to  affect  negatively  the 
utilization percentage, a market demand variable and the number of operators acting 
in the industry. The last variable is the core of the analysis. When an alliance is formed 
the  number  of  operators  decrease  so  if  it  is  true  that  strategic  alliances  mean 
operating benefits and economies of scale the relationship between the two variables 
would  be  negative.  When  an  alliance  is  formed  the  number  of  operators  in  the 
industry decreases and the average vessel utilization in the market increases, this is 
the main hypothesis to be tested in this research.
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The following graphs show the relation  among de different independent variables 
 
introduced in the model and the Utilization variable: 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Alphaliner’s monthly monitor data 
 
 
It is clear the relationship between the two variables plotted in this graph, it is also 
interesting to see the seasonal component of the demand for shipping liner’s services, 
which also affects the utilization rate and which is mainly caused by the paralysation of 
the Chinese economy at the first months of each year, coinciding with the “Chinese 
new  year”.  It  can  also  be  seen that the correlation  between the two variables is 
increasing with time so it seems possible that supply is increasing its ability and 
flexibility to match the demand.
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Source: Own elaboration from Alphaliner’s monthly monitor data 
 
The average ship size follows an increasing pattern through time, it does not seem to 
have a close relation with the variable analysed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Alphaliner’s monthly monitor data
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The core variable of this analysis, the number of operators in the industry, seems to be 
quite uncorrelated with the utilization level, it is true that after the October 2011, 
when G6 is formed, the average utilization does never fall below the 70% but it does 
not seem enough to consider for the moment that one variable is causal of the other, 
much  more  analysis  is still  needed  and the OLS  estimation  is needed  in order to 
introduce light to this relation. 
 
It is also possible that forming a strategic alliance does not affect the other variables 
immediately; it is really probable that a specific period of time is needed for alliances 
to begin working correctly and to affect the market.  To begin to operate jointly with a 
company with which there was no relation before is a difficult and long process so it 
seems reasonable that the effects of a decrease in the number of operators do not 
appear until a period of time has passed. To show and test this effect lagged variables 
of “Number of operators” have been introduced in the analysis. 
 
Lagged variables up to 24 periods have been introduced and the apparently more 
significant were the 1 lag observation, this is one month lagged variable and the one 
year lagged variable, this is 12 observations lag. This is why the variables regressed 
against “Average % of Utilization” are the 1 and 12 lagged variables of “Number of 
operators” 
 
The OLS estimation following the next function has been estimated in order to assess 
the effects of changes in the independent variables to the dependent variable, the 
average rate of ship’s capacity utilization: 
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The result of the OLS estimation using monthly data from Alphaliner maritime 
consultancy and covering the time period from January 2009 to March 2015 is as 
follows: 
 
Modelo 1: estimaciones MCO utilizando las 63 observaciones 2010:01-2015:03 
 
 
Variable dependiente: Utilization 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coeficiente Desv. típica Estadístico t valor p  
Const 2,57296 0,377548 6,8149 <0,00001 *** 
Demand 4,21644e-07 4,2753e-08 9,8623 <0,00001 *** 
Number_of_o_1 -0,0227662 0,00927259 -2,4552 0,01710 ** 
Number_of    12 -0,103567 0,0202169 -5,1228 <0,00001 *** 
Average_ship_si -0,000305885 5,16627e-05 -5,9208 <0,00001 *** 
 
 
 
Media de la var. dependiente = 0,888429 
Desviación típica de la var. dependiente. = 0,0695819 
Suma de cuadrados de los residuos = 0,0962354 
Desviación típica de los residuos = 0,0407337 
R2 = 0,679409 
R2 corregido = 0,6573 
Estadístico F (4, 58) = 30,729 (valor p < 0,00001) 
Estadístico de Durbin-Watson = 1,59401 
Coef. de autocorr. de primer orden. = 0,175734 
Log-verosimilitud = 114,856 
Criterio de información de Akaike = -219,712 
Criterio de información Bayesiano de Schwarz = -208,996 
Criterio de Hannan-Quinn = -215,497 
 
 
 
 
Analysing the principal indicators, all variables are significant at a 5% confidence level, 
the model explains a 68% of the variability of the dependent variable, twelve 
observations among 75 are loosed due to the introduction of a twelve periods lagged 
variable and there seems to not exist multicollinearity among the dependent variables.
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Error term seem to be also no auto-correlated so the estimation seems to pass the 
main tests. 
 
The first variable to be analysed is “Demand”. This variable is highly correlated with 
the dependent variable, it is significant at a 1% level and it is probably the variable that 
explains the majority of the variability of the utilization rate. It has been introduced in 
order to create a correct model because it seems clear that demand in a market is the 
main driver of the utilization rate in that market. If there is a drop in the effective 
demand and supply remains constant the utilization of the ships will decrease. 
 
The main hypothesis tested in this regression is whether the parameter of the variable 
 
“Number of operators” is significant or not and it appears to be really significant, at a 
 
1% level of confidence for the 12 periods lag. For the 1 month lag it is statistically 
significant at a 5% level of confidences so the null hypothesis that says that the effect 
of a change in the number of operators has no effect to the average utilization level of 
the industry 1 and 12 months later is rejected at a 5% confidence level. 
 
This result introduces some light and confirms the initial assumption demonstrating 
that, at least from a statistical point of view, the process of alliances among different 
carriers  has  an  effect  to  the  total  utilization  level  of  the  ships.  The  argument 
introduced previously that alliances would take some time to operate correctly, mainly 
due to difficulties in implementing the joint process, to introduce an effective 
communication between both parts and to adapt the behaviour of two or more 
completely different carriers, has been also confirmed. The two lagged variables tested 
were  the  more  significant  and  they  appear  both  to  be  significant.  This  result  is 
coherent with common sense, it seems logical from an economic point of view that 
rigidities of different kinds, such as informational rigidities or inefficiencies at a 
contractual level, in addition to the rigidities in the process of implementing, of even 
designing, an operational plan for a really complex market would let the strategic 
alliances to need a more or less long period to acquire a good enough level of know 
how in order to produce gains in efficiency an operational benefits to the industry.
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The coefficient of 1 month lagged variable of “Number of operators” is (-0,023), this is 
coherent with the initial assumptions as a reduction of the operators would mean an 
increase in the utilization level. Specifically a strategic alliance among two carriers, this 
is the case of the last alliance done, the 2M alliance formed by Maersk and MSC, would 
mean a reduction of one in the number of operators and an increase of the 2,3% of the 
utilization level the next month. 
 
Analysing the coefficient   of the one year lagged variable it is founded to be more 
significant than the one month lag and even the coefficient of the variable is higher so 
the largest effect on utilization of a decrease in the number of operators seems to 
appear when a period on twelve months have passed. The coefficient is (- 0,103), so 
after a period on an year the settlement of a two members alliance would mean an 
increase of a 10,3% in the average ship utilization level of the industry. If we add the 
two effects, because the first effect is also acting when the twelve months effect 
happens, the total result is an increase of the utilization level of 12,6%. This is a really 
big number so strategic alliances would be really justified in terms of increasing the 
operational efficiency of maritime transport. 
 
The second variable to be analysed is the average size of the vessels operating in the 
industry. This average size has been increasing constantly during the observed period 
driven by the introduction of megaships in the industry. A megaship, as previously 
explained, introduces economies of scale in the industry, so it causes gains of efficiency 
but, on the other hand, it may introduce operational problems. The variable “Average 
ship size” is significant at a 1% confidence level so it  there is a clear relationship 
between  the  introduction  of  megaships  and  the  utilization  of  these  ships,  the 
coefficient is negative so introducing new and larger ships in the transport sector 
causes the difficulty to full these ships to increase, this is represented in the model by 
the utilization of the vessels decreasing. The coefficient of the variable is (-0,0003) so 
an increase of 1.000 TEUs by the average ship of the industry would mean a decrease 
of the utilization average of the 30%. This is a really high value and an increase of 1.000 
TEUs  in  the  ships  average  seems  to  be  a  realistic  assumption.  Upon  the  period
26  
analysed this variable has increase from 2.649,5 on January, 2009 to 3.687,4 on March 
 
2015. 
 
 
There are two main forces operating nowadays in the maritime transport industry; the 
first one is the creation of strategic alliances among the different carriers which used 
to compete in the past, the second is the order, and effective construction, of 
megaships that are near to surpass the line of the 20.000 TEUs barrier, line that was 
seen impossible to cross not long time ago. These two forces have opposite effects on 
the core variable of this analysis so it seems reasonable than the two processes are 
truly correlated and cannot be understood separately. On the one hand we have the 
delivery of every time bigger vessels in order to achieve economies of scale and reduce 
cost per TEU, but this process has negative effects from an operational point of view, 
to solve this and to try to avoid these negative effects carriers have begun a process of 
strategic alliances, of reduction of the number of operators in the industry, that has 
increased the average rate of containership utilization in the industry. 
 
Understanding  the  formation  of  strategic  alliances  as  the  reduction of  number  of 
operators in the industry means a decrease in the number of operators. Remaining 
constant all other variables so the total output of the industry being the same, a 
decrease in the number of operators means an increase in the average output  by 
operator. This is the principal reasoning in this investigation. Strategic alliances have 
been proved to increase the utilization rate of ships and the utilization of a ship is 
clearly one of the main drivers of the cost per TEU function. The first table of costs was 
represented assuming a 100% level of utilization, so the final step is to remove that 
hypothesis and to substitute the variable “Utilization” with the model estimated 
previously. 
 
If variable “Demand” is kept constant at an 8.000 level and “average ship size” is fixed 
at a 3.500 point the effect of the reduction of the number of operators, this is the 
formation of strategic alliances, can be estimated.
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The next graph shows cost per TEU function by different vessel sizes and different 
 
number of operators in the industry: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Own  elaboration  from  Stopford  (2004),  OECD  (2015),  Port  Authority  of  Barcelona  and 
 
Alphaliner’s consultancy 
 
 
Analysing  this  graph  it  seems  clear  than  strategic  alliances  have  an  effect  in  the 
average total cost representative function of the maritime transport sector, it can be 
understood as setting up higher rate of utilization of the ships or as allowing the 
operators to full the new megaships they are introducing in the market. What seems 
clear is that the process of introducing new and larger ships, jointly with the 
establishment of operational synergies and agreements  among operators with the 
creation  of  strategic  alliances  is  making  the  liner  shipping  industry  much  more 
efficient.
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic alliances have been one of the principal factors of the evolution of the 
maritime  transport  sector  since  the  first  agreements  that  resulted  in  the  Grand 
Alliance and the New World Alliance in 1996. This form of horizontal integration has its 
particularities, advantages and disadvantages; it is an agreement to operate 
containerships jointly, to schedule the routes and frequencies and to share slots and 
equipments without losing the juridical independence, so without merging. This 
introduces implicit instability in the agreement in addition to incentives to break the 
deal and act against the common good of the alliance. Is for that reason that the 
consolidation of  that form of  cooperation has been slow and knowhow has been 
achieved during a difficult process, some alliances have failed and operators have 
broken the agreement, others have been forbidden by public authorities. 
 
However strategic alliances are consolidated nowadays, the creation of the G6 alliance 
on 2011 and the formation of Ocean 3 and 2M in January 2015 confirmed the pattern 
in the industry and actually alliances are seen as the best way of horizontal integration 
in order to gain efficiency and reduce costs. 
 
To operate mega-ships is also the reason that has consolidated strategic agreements; 
the average size of vessels has increased constantly and every time bigger ships are 
being delivered to companies, surpassing the barrier of 20.000 TEUs. This increasing in 
containerships capacity has come in parallel with the phenomena analysed and both 
are clearly correlated, operating a mega-ship is an adventure in which it is difficult to 
succeed, it means losing flexibility, concentrating the cargo with the increase in costs 
that this means and needing an absurdly huge critical mass in order to obtain a 
reasonable level of capacity utilization. 
 
Economies  of  scale,  that  result  of  a  strategic  alliance  among  different  maritime 
carriers, have been tested during this investigation and alliances have been confirmed 
as a good way to increase ship capacity utilization and to reduce average total costs.
29  
The main force behind this fact is the increase in ships capacity utilization due to the 
operational synergies that acting jointly as an alliance provides. 
 
It is not the same loading a mega-ship of 20.000 TEUs alone, with the difficulties is 
terms of slot chartering and inland transportation that this has that doing this together 
with one or two different carriers. It is also probable that carriers are simply unable to 
catch  enough  critical  mass  acting  alone.  If  total  production  that  needs  to  be 
transported at a determinate day remains relatively stable it is simply impossible that 
all the carriers that used to do that service continue doing it with double sized vessels. 
It is true that competition may cause some carriers to stop doing that service up to the 
point where there is enough critique mass to full the ship of one or two carriers but 
this is a long and hard process, supply is really slow to adjust to demand in the vessel 
transport sector and strategic alliances seem to be the best way to undertake that 
process and to adjust operational capacity in order to avoid a hard crisis that could 
have hit the industry. 
 
Liner shipping alliances are supposed to be implemented gradually so it is logical that 
the effect on efficiency and other variables is found once some time has passed. This 
period of time has been founded to be a year, once twelve months have passed the 
agreement is fully operative and effects on average utilization are completed. These 
effects have been founded to be of about 13% of previous utilization level by settling 
an agreement between two big carriers; this is a really large number that shows the 
good results of that way of horizontal integration when introducing operational gains. 
 
The increase in vessel size has also been founded as crucial to understand the 
operational efficiency of the industry so the average utilization level of ships capacity. 
As ships capacity increases it is every time more difficult to load them, the critical mass 
needed to achieve a sufficient level of utilization to ensure sustainability and 
profitability is larger and it needs to be concentrated in peaks of cargo, thing difficult 
to achieve by the exporting and the importing industry and the transport operators, 
both inland and maritime.
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An increase of 1.000 TEUs in the average vessel size reduces average vessel loading by 
a 30%, this is a really important figure and illustrates why the process of alliances have 
had such a good effect in terms of operational efficiency. If those ships were operated 
without the advantages that acting together introduces average utilization would have 
dropped intensively causing tremendous looses to carriers and maybe a huge crisis in 
the industry which could have damaged all stakeholders, from ports to shippers, in 
addition to inland logistics operators and obviously the final costumers. Average 
utilization  level  has  kept  constant  or  even  increased  so  strategic  alliances  are 
confirmed as a success. 
 
These two processes, the building of mega-ships and the establishment of alliances 
have appeared together and have been interacting during the last decade, they are 
closely correlated and one cannot be understood without the other. If mega-ships 
were not built strategic alliances would not be needed to maintain the level of 
utilization in the market, which was relatively high before, and if strategic alliances 
were not formed it is simply impossible that mega-ships were operated correctly, fact 
that would have let the industry to a hard reorganizational period and probably the 
same level of concentration in the industry. This establishes a link with the main theory 
that has ruled the literature about shipping liners and the main regulations of the 
sector. 
 
That theory explains that it is impossible that the service of transporting containers by 
ship from one extreme of the world to the other and obtain profits in an industry 
where there are a big number of operators. The fixed costs and the operational 
difficulties are too large so there would exist an “empty core” in a game with many 
agents.   This has been probably exacerbated by the apparition of mega-ships so the 
number of operators in the market needed to provide a core to the game may have 
decreased, this could be one explanation to the process of strategic alliances in liner 
shipping. 
 
Whether the previous theory is true or not it is clear that the combined process of 
mega-ship  operating  and  jointly  acting  has  introduced  gains  in  efficiency  so  the
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economies of scale in the carriers industry seem to be clear. This cost reduction does 
not mean increases in the consumer surplus, lower freight rates or increases in the 
total welfare of the economy. It is possible than cost reduction goes to the supplier 
surplus due to the capacity that concentration of the industry gives to the agents to 
collude and fix monopoly prices. If this happens the situation described during this 
investigation may simply suppose a transfer of costs from maritime operators to inland 
operators and final consumers. If the reduction of costs is not transferred to the final 
price that would mean that all costs of the reorganization process, investments that 
ports are doing and the process of adaptation of inland transport operators, as well as 
the bad services and uncertainty produced during the process of settling the alliance, 
are assumed by agents that do not form part of the maritime industry, by the whole 
population.  That  would  mean  a  clear  transfer  of  resources  from  a  part  of  the 
population to an organized sector, an externality and a clear inefficiency. 
 
Studying all that is out of the scope of my final degree investigation but, and due to the 
clear importance that the maritime transport sector has for a healthy, competitive and 
sustainable economy, as well as for the welfare of the population, it would be really 
interesting to go further with this investigation and assess the effects of liner shipping 
alliances on total welfare.
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